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No. 97-3532 
 
OIL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS UNION 
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v. 
 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION, GREGORY WATCHMAN, Acting 
Administrator of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, ALEXIS HERMAN, Secretary of  Labor, 
 
       Respondents. 
 
On Petition for an Order Compelling Respondents 
to Cease Unreasonable Delay and to Initiate a Rulemaking 
on Hexavalent Chromium 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 13, 1998 
 
Before: GREENBERG, SCIRICA and ALDISERT, 
Circuit Judges. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
Before the Court is not a petition for review of the final 
order of an administrative agency but a petition for an 
order compelling the respondents, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration ("OSHA"), its Acting 
Administrator and the Secretary of Labor, to cease 
unreasonable delay in rulemaking on hexavalent 
chromium. In addition, petitioners Oil, Chemical and 
Atomic Workers Union and Public Citizen's Health Research 
Group request this court to: (1) retain jurisdiction to 
monitor OSHA's performance; (2) require OSHA to submit 
periodic status reports; (3) authorize petitioners to conduct 
discovery before recommending to this Court a feasible 
schedule for the rulemaking and (4) direct OSHA to issue a 
proposed rule and a final standard for hexavalent 
chromium within a firm timetable. 
 
Petitioners allege that we have subject matter jurisdiction 
over their claims pursuant to three statutes: (1) The All 
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1651(a), (2) the judicial review 
provisions of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 
U.S.C. S 655(f), and (3) the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. S 706(1). We hold that a writ of mandamus is not 
available under these circumstances and, even though this 
Court is vested with jurisdiction to review the Secretary's 
actions for unreasonable delay, the facts here do not 
warrant our intervention in the agency's rulemaking. We 
will therefore deny the petition. 
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I. 
 
Chromium has, in one form or another, been used since 
the eighteenth century in various industries, most 
significantly in the production of metal alloys. Chromium 
VI, or hexavalent chromium, is a structural and anti- 
corrosive element which has been used in the metal, 
chemical, pigment, aviation and graphics industries, among 
others.1 In 1997, OSHA estimated that between 200,000 
and 700,000 workers in these industries are regularly 
exposed to hexavalent chromium. 62 Fed. Reg. at 21978 
(1997). 
 
In 1971, in response to concerns that hexavalent 
chromium is a carcinogen, OSHA exercised its rulemaking 
authority and adopted a national consensus standard for 
hexavalent chromium. See 29 U.S.C. S 655(a) (directing the 
Secretary to promulgate such standards immediately upon 
passage of the OSH Act in 1970). This standard, which is 
still in effect today, set for workers a permissible exposure 
limit ("PEL") of 100 micrograms of chromium per cubic 
meter of air (100 ug/m3). 29 C.F.R. S 1910.1000. 
 
In July 1993, Petitioners filed their first petition for 
rulemaking with OSHA requesting emergency action under 
the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. S 655(c).2  That petition pointed to 
contemporary studies of the elevated risks of respiratory 
cancer for workers exposed to hexavalent chromium, and 
requested that the Secretary immediately lower the PEL for 
hexavalent chromium in the workplace. The Secretary 
declined to set an emergency temporary standard because 
he found the evidence insufficient to support the allegation 
that a standard was immediately "necessary" to protect 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Hexavalent chromium includes agents such as chromic acid (used in 
chrome plating), potassium dichromate (chemistry and various 
industries) and lead chromate (pigment). 
 
2. 29 U.S.C. S 655(c) provides, in relevant part: 
 
       The Secretary shall provide . . . for an emergency temporary 
       standard . . . if he determines (A) that employees are exposed to 
       grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to 
       be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that 
       such emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from 
       such danger. 
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workers from such a "grave danger." Instead, OSHA 
undertook research into proposed rulemaking regarding 
hexavalent chromium. "We anticipate," it wrote the 
petitioners, "that Notice of Proposed Rulemaking will be 
published in the Federal Register not later than March 
1995." 
 
Because of many unanticipated factors--the release of a 
breakthrough study on workers exposed to chromium 
which necessitated detailed examination, "the results of the 
November 1994 elections" in Congress, government 
shutdowns, budget cuts, the need to study potential 
compliance with a new PEL, the need to consult with small 
businesses and the reprioritizing of other agency projects-- 
OSHA has not issued a notice of proposed rulemaking on 
hexavalent chromium. It now anticipates a September 1999 
date as its tentative deadline for a rulemaking proposal. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
This is an unusual petition requesting extraordinary 
relief. First, we must set forth our jurisdictional posture to 
consider such a petition. We find that under the OSH Act, 
this Court is vested with jurisdiction to conduct judicial 
review over health and safety standards issued by the 
Secretary of Labor, as well as over claims in which the 
Secretary has not yet acted but where her delay is allegedly 
unreasonable. The OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. S 655(f), provides: 
 
       Any person who may be adversely affected by a 
       standard issued under this section may at any time 
       prior to the sixtieth day after such standard is 
       promulgated file a petition challenging the validity of 
       such standard with the United States court of appeals 
       for the circuit wherein such person resides or has his 
       principal place of business, for a judicial review of such 
       standard. 
 
On its face, the statute grants jurisdiction to the courts of 
appeals for standards already issued by the Secretary. 
Nevertheless, courts have interpreted the OSH Act's grant 
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of jurisdiction, when read in conjunction with the APA, as 
enabling judicial review not only of standards already 
promulgated, but also of "agency action unlawfully withheld 
or unreasonably delayed". See Action on Smoking & Health 
v. Department of Labor, 28 F.3d 162, 163-164 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (OSH Act S 655(f) and APA "respectively confer 
jurisdiction on this court . . . over suits seeking relief from 
agency inaction or delay that jeopardizes our future 
statutory power of review."); Public Citizen's Health 
Research Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 629 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (reviewing OSHA's delay in rulemaking). In fact, 
where administrative enabling statutes such as the OSH 
Act grant exclusive jurisdiction to a particular court to 
review past actions of an agency, that court necessarily has 
the exclusive jurisdiction to review inaction, as well. See 
Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 
F.2d 70, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 
Next, because this Court has been vested with exclusive 
jurisdiction over OSHA standards, the APA determines the 
scope of our review when standards have not yet been 
promulgated: "To the extent necessary," we shall "compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed". 5 U.S.C. S 706(1); see also Williams v. National 
School of Health Tech., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 273, 280 (E.D. Pa. 
1993) ("The correct mechanism for bringing a claim of 
unreasonable delay in promulgating regulations is the 
Administrative Procedure Act (`APA') which specifically 
provides that a court may `compel agency action 
unreasonably delayed.' 5 U.S.C. S 706(1)."). 
 
B. 
 
Applying these principles to review OSHA's rulemaking 
process for unreasonable delay here, we are called upon to 
balance the importance of the subject matter being 
regulated with the regulating agency's need to discharge all 
of its statutory responsibilities under a reasonable 
timetable. See Environmental Defense Fund v. United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 902 F.2d 785, 789-790 (10th 
Cir. 1990); Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 896 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). With this balance in mind, unreasonable delay 
should be measured by the following factors: 
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       First, the court should ascertain the length of time that 
       has elapsed since the agency came under a duty to act. 
       Second, the reasonableness of the delay should be 
       judged in the context of the statute authorizing the 
       agency's action. Third, the court should assess the 
       consequences of the agency's delay. Fourth, the court 
       should consider "any plea of administrative error, 
       administrative inconvenience, practical difficulty in 
       carrying out a legislative mandate, or need to prioritize 
       in the fact of limited resources." 
 
The Raymond Proffitt Found. v. United States Envtl. 
Protection Agency, 930 F. Supp. 1088, 1102 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(quoting In re Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 1149 
(D.C. Cir. 1992)). In the end, application of these factors to 
a particular case is fact-intensive. We must begin a 
discussion of agency action, or inaction, by affording the 
agency "considerable deference in establishing a timetable 
for completing its proceedings." Cutler, 818 F.2d at 896. 
 
Distilled to its essence, this petition by Oil, Chemical and 
Public Citizen would have us intrude into the quintessential 
discretion of the Secretary of Labor to allocate OSHA's 
resources and set its priorities. It is certainly true that 
"[d]elays that might be altogether reasonable in the sphere 
of economic regulation are less tolerable when human lives 
are at stake." Cutler, 818 F.2d at 989; see also 
Environmental Defense Fund, 902 F.2d at 789. This 
presupposes, however, that the evidence before the agency 
sufficiently demonstrates that delay will in fact adversely 
affect human health to a degree which necessitates a 
priority response. The Petitioners allege that between 88 
and 342 out of every 1,000 workers exposed to hexavalent 
chromium will die from cancer attributable to the 
chromium exposure. Petitioners' Mem. at 17. On the other 
hand, the Respondents and Intervenors raise serious 
questions about the validity of the data and assumptions 
underlying the Petitioners' calculations. For example, 
Intervenor Color Pigments Manufacturers Association, Inc. 
argues that the Petitioners are wrong to assume that all 
workers in industries dealing with chromium in some way 
or another are exposed to 100 ug/m3 hexavalent chromium, 
every working day for 45 years. Color Pigments asserts that 
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this calculation is faulty because it fails to consider that 1) 
OSHA's lead PEL standard, 29 C.F.R. S 1910.1025(c), 
reduces all workers' lead exposure, which in turn reduces 
chromium exposure by one-half for workers in the pigment 
industry; 2) pigment workers often breathe through 
respirators which protect them from exposure to lead and 
chromium and 3) the Petitioners' calculations fail to 
distinguish between lead chromate, a chromium compound 
with levels of bioavailability and toxicity that have not been 
linked to any cancer, and other hexavalent chromium 
compounds used in different industries. Id. at 5-8. In 
addition, Intervenor The Chrome Coalition points to a 
plethora of studies which demonstrate the inconclusivity of 
hexavalent chromium's role in causing cancer because the 
effects of smoking and asbestos exposure on workers have 
not been fully considered. Chrome Coalition Mem. at 14-15 
n.10. Faced with such varying data and differing 
interpretations as these studies represent, this Court is not 
in a position to tell the Secretary how to do her job. 
 
"OSHA not only possesses enormous technical expertise 
we lack, but must juggle competing rulemaking demands 
on its limited scientific and legal staff." Brock, 823 F.2d at 
629; see also Environmental Defense Fund, 902 F.2d at 
789. Its various obligations notwithstanding, OSHA has 
been far from idle in its consideration of hexavalent 
chromium. This is not a subject matter to which the agency 
has never given a thought, but is rather already regulated 
in the workplace by the agency's current standards. 
Moreover, OSHA has amassed a wealth of data reanalyzing 
the health risks of hexavalent chromium and is currently in 
the process of collecting information about the feasibility of 
any proposed alterations to the standards now in place. 
Although 5 U.S.C. S 706(1) directs reviewing courts to 
"compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed," we are satisfied that the facts alleged here do not 
demonstrate inaction that is either contrary to a specific 
Congressional mandate, in violation of a specific court 
order or unduly transgressive of the agency's own tentative 
deadlines. Cf. United Steelworkers of America v. 
Pendergrass, 819 F.2d 1263, 1270 (3d Cir. 1987) (enforcing 
prior judgment); United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 
763 F.2d 728, 739 (3d Cir. 1985) (ordering reformulation of 
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standard to comply with statutory directive). We therefore 
conclude that, on the record accompanying this petition, 
OSHA has not "unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed" the responsibility of rulemaking. 
 
III. 
 
Having concluded that the facts and the law presented 
before us do not establish a necessity for us to intervene in 
the Secretary's discretion to conduct the affairs of OSHA in 
this matter, it is clear that we do not have the authority to 
grant relief under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.S 1651(a). "In 
order to secure a writ of mandamus, petitioner must 
establish that the government officer in question has a non- 
discretionary duty to perform the specified action. The legal 
duty must be `clear and indisputable.' " See Virgin Islands 
v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 832 (3d Cir. 1987). On the basis 
of the allegations contained in the petition and the 
responses to them, we cannot grant relief under the 
concept of mandamus. Howsoever other courts of appeals 
may construe this writ, the tradition of this Court and its 
ruling case law severely limit the grant of mandamus relief. 
A writ is not available here. 
 
* * * * * * * 
 
We have considered all arguments advanced by the 
parties and have concluded that no further discussion is 
necessary. 
 
The petition for an order will be denied. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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